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ABSTRACT: A critic often conveys what underlies her criticism, but imprecisely, leaving it unclear to 
the arguer what argumentative strategy to adopt. I elaborate on the opponent's “burden of criticism” 
by using argumentation schemes. For example, the critic may challenge a thesis by saying “Why? Says 
who?,” without conveying whether she could be convinced with an argument from expert opinion, or 
from position to know, or from popularity. What are fair dialogue rules for dealing with unspecific 
criticism? 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
According to the dialogical approach to argumentation, arguments are inextricably 
bound up with critical dialogue, so that in order to get a hold on the nature of 
argumentation, as well as on the norms with which to evaluate arguments, we 
should get clear on the nature of criticism, as well as on the norms that govern 
critical reactions. It is assumed in this paper (and defended in Van Laar and Krabbe, 
2012) that an opponent (also labeled: the critic, or antagonist of an opinion or an 
argument) has a responsibility, and sometimes even a dialogical obligation to 
provide the proponent (also: the arguer, protagonist of an opinion or argument) 
with a counter-consideration that explains her critical stance. An argumentative 
dialogue improves when the opponent, spontaneously or on request, provides her 
motivations for being critical, and thereby provides the proponent with some 
strategic advice about how to convince her. For example, in addition to a mere 
challenge, “Why would you think it’s going to rain?” the opponent might add a 
counterconsideration, “As far as I know, no weatherman forecasted rain,” that both 
explains to the proponent what underlies her critical stance and provides him with 
an implicit suggestion about how to convince her. 
In this paper, I expand on this normative theory by examining the required 
level of specificity of counter-considerations. The question to be answered is: To 
what extent should the opponent specify, or disambiguate, or elaborate on her 
critical stance by way of such counter-considerations? Sometimes, a counter-
consideration does provide the proponent with some information about what 
underlies the opponent’s critical stance, but not enough for choosing an appropriate 
argumentative strategy that might satisfy the opponent's needs. What set of fair 
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dialogue rules would enable the proponent to urge the opponent to specify her 
critical attitude further, without making it too hard on an opponent who has no 
special expertise on the topic at hand, or lacks otherwise resources that enable her 
to be sufficiently precise about her critical position? Four norms shall be proposed 
that can be implemented within a more or less formalized model of dialogue.  
In Section 2, I shall emphasize the importance of criticism for understanding 
argumentation by distinguishing between three ways in which criticism directs the 
development of argumentative dialogue. In Section 2, 3 and 4, I shall deal with 
conceptualizing the various types of criticism (based on Krabbe & Van Laar, 2011) 
and with the norms for raising criticism (based on Van Laar & Krabbe, 2013). In 
Section 5, I shall discuss how a critical reaction can be more or less specific, and 
thereby less or more in need of (further) clarification. In Section 6, I shall propose 
dialogue norms for dealing with less than fully specific criticisms. In Section 7, some 
consequences for the dialogical theory of ambiguity shall be examined. 
 
2. THE IMPACT OF CRITICISM 
 
According to dialogical perspectives on argumentation, an argument is an attempt to 
answer criticism of a particular position by offering reasonable grounds 
(Finocchiaro, 1980; Krabbe, 2007). For example, within the pragma-dialectical 
theory, argumentation is an attempt to persuade an antagonist who, within the 
framework of a critical discussion, probes and assesses the protagonist’s standpoint 
and his arguments (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). Within the formal 
dialectical theories that have their roots in Hamblin's Fallacies (1970), such as the 
model for permissive persuasion dialogue (Walton & Krabbe, 1995), a proponent of a 
thesis tries to answer all challenges in such a way that the result is a sequence of 
reasoning that starts from propositions that the opponent is willing to commit 
herself to, and that results in the proponent’s conclusion.  
The opponent, then, should not be a passive recipient of the proponent’s 
attempts to build his opinion on unshakable grounds. Instead, the proponent’s 
argumentation is for a large part the result of the opponent’s decisions. In existing 
normative dialogue theories, the opponent's discretionary power becomes apparent 
in her right to make three types of decisions. Before listing these, I shall expound on 
a typical, though highly simplified normative model for critical discussion, so that 
we have a point of departure for discussing the functions of criticism, as well as for 
proposing dialogue norms with which to answer the question of the current paper. 
The model is dubbed “basic critical discussion” (presented in van Laar, 
2007), and it includes only some essential features of the four stages of the 
normative model of a critical discussion, as developed by van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (2004). At a preliminary stage (cf. opening stage in Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst), the opponent determines her initial concessions. Concessions are 
propositional commitments that the opponent cannot challenge, or criticize 
otherwise, at least not without further ado, but the opponent does not have a 
burden of proof for them. (Below, we shall discuss presumptive commitments, 
which are dealt with as a special kind of concessions, that can also be incurred at a 
later stage of the dialogue.) At the first stage (cf. confrontation stage), both 
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participants express their single, non-mixed difference of opinion. In the example in 
Figure 1, the proponent has expressed a positive attitude towards proposition A, 
whereas the opponent makes it clear that she takes a critical attitude towards A. 
The common goal of the participants is to find out whether they can resolve 
their difference of opinion, and if so, in whose favor. The examination of this issue 
takes place within the second stage, the argumentation stage, where the participants 
exchange arguments and criticisms. At this stage, the participants distribute tasks, 
according to a dialectical division of labor.1  
According to this division of labor, the individual aim of the proponent is to 
show to the opponent that her critical  attitude towards his opinion is inconsistent, 
or otherwise untenable. His strategy is to develop a configuration of reasoning that 
starts from the opponent’s concessions and that results in his standpoint. Such a 
configuration of reasoning, used for persuasive purposes, is what I call 
argumentation.  
 The individual aim of the opponent is to explain to the proponent that her 
critical position is consistent, or tenable. Her strategy is to raise critical questions, 
and other types of criticism, in an attempt at showing how she can resist the 
proponent’s standpoint consistently, notwithstanding her initial concessions. Note 
that in the model the opponent does not defend a thesis of her own, and that the 
dispute is and remains non-mixed. 
According to the dialogue rules that underlie the sample dialogues in Figure 
1, the dialogue starts with the proponent’s standpoint, A, and the opponent’s 
challenge of it. After this confrontation, the proponent at each turn either provides 
an argument in favor of a challenged proposition, or he gives up. The opponent at 
each subsequent turn either challenges the regular premise of the proponent’s last 
argument (B, in the proponent’s argument at the third stage), or she challenges the 
connection premise, which is the conditional statement that expresses the 
argumentative connection between the regular premise and the proposition it 
supports (If B then A, in the proponent’s argument at the third stage),2 or the 
opponent gives up. Note that a move of the form “Why ()?”, throughout this paper, 
is a request for an argument and not a request for explanation. A separate locution 
shall be introduced for expressing requests for explanation, below. The move of 
giving up concludes the dialogue, and constitutes its final stage. One essential rule 
for the argumentation stage is that the opponent is not allowed to challenge a 
statement that is in her set of initial concessions. In other words: These concessions 
can function as the proper points of departure of the argumentation that the 
proponent stepwise develops in response to the critical reactions. In Section 5, I 
shall propose how to extend this system so that it may accommodate the right of a 
proponent to urge the opponent to explain her critical stance by way of a counter-
consideration. 
                                                        
1 Rescher refers to this division of labor as a probative asymmetry (1977, pp. 17-18). 
2 The only reason to assume that there is a separate connection premise is that the opponent can 
make a point of contention of the argumentative connection between the argument’s premises and 
its conclusion. 
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Figure 1: A profile of dialogue, showing a number of possible dialogues in 
accordance with the model for basic critical discussion 
 
In this kind of framework, the opponent influences the development of the 
proponent's argumentation in two ways. 
First, the opponent decides what propositions to concede, and thereby 
determines what propositions the proponent can use as the starting points of his 
defense. This can be done, as in basic critical discussion, at a preliminary stage, but 
in more advanced models the opponent may as well concede propositions in the 
course of the argumentative exchange. In order to enable the proponent to make a 
serious attempt to realize his individual aim of persuading the opponent, there 
should be a responsibility on the opponent’s part to be fully clear about the 
substance of her commitments. Otherwise, the proponent does not stand a chance at 
developing an interesting, high quality, ex concessis argumentation. Of course, this 
also implies an obligation to phrase concessions in a sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous manner.  
Second, the opponent decides what parts of the proponent’s standpoint to 
criticize, as well as what premises to put to the test. Note that she can also challenge 
reasons that have been left implicit, such as in our model, connection premises. To 
use Searle’s term in a somewhat different way, all critical reactions are directive 
(Searle, 1979), in the sense that they direct the proponent to make particular 
choices. With her critical reactions, the opponent actively steers the course of the 
dialogue, and thereby the structure and substance of the proponent’s 
argumentation, if the proponent is receptive to the opponent's demands. 
In an enriched model, that has been suggested in (van Laar & Krabbe, 2013), 
the opponent has a third device for directing the course of the proponent’s 
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argumentation. According to that proposal, the opponent decides whether to inform 
the proponent about the kind of argumentation that she would consider convincing, 
or about the propositions that he should refute, and if so, with what counter-
consideration she informs the proponent about it. Consequently, even in a non-
mixed discussion, the opponent may put forward reasoning, though not for 
persuasive purposes, but for the explanatory purpose of informing the proponent 
about her motivations for being critical. It is the proponent who discharges a burden 
of proof, and the opponent who, in trying to explain what her critical position 
amounts to, tries to discharge a rather different burden of criticism.  
 
3. THE WAYS OF CRITICISM 
 
Criticism, as understood here, is a speech act, or complex of speech acts, with which 
a participant either puts forward a negative evaluation of an argumentative 
contribution by her interlocutor, or at least alludes to such a negative evaluation by 
making it clear that if the interlocutor will not respond satisfactorily to the criticism, 
a negative evaluation will be forthcoming (Krabbe & Van Laar, 2011). A simple 
challenge forms an example of the latter kind of criticism: “Why A? I’m not 
convinced yet; Can you give me an argument?” A particular type of critical reaction 
can be characterized by specifying each of four parameters: the focus of a critical 
reaction, the norm appealed to in a critical reaction, the level at which a critical 
reaction is put forward, and the illocutionary force of a critical reaction (Krabbe & 
Van Laar, 2011). A criticism could be insufficiently clear with respect to each of 
these four aspects, and I shall indicate some of these unclear criticisms. A more in-
depth treatment of the level of specificity of explanatory counter-considerations, 
which is the central issue of this paper, shall be postponed until Section 5. 
 
3.1 Focus 
 
A critical reaction is about a contribution by the interlocutor, and the focus of a 
critical reaction specifies what exactly the criticism is about. For example, if the 
focus is on the main standpoint, for instance “It is going to rain next week,” or on a 
regular reason, for instance “weatherman Erwin says so,” the criticism is called 
tenability criticism (Krabbe & Van Laar, 2011; cf. Krabbe, 2007): “why should we 
think it rains next week?” or if the reason has been offered, “Why should I accept 
that Erwin made this very forecast?” Alternatively, the focus can be on the 
connection between a regular reason and the supported standpoint, called 
connection criticism (Krabbe, 2007): “Why should we accept it is going to rain next 
week, if weatherman Erwin says so?” 
 The opponent may also target the argumentation scheme that underlies the 
proponent’s argument. In addition to raising a connection criticism, with which the 
opponent challenges the specific connection between the premises and this 
particular conclusion, the opponent may also choose to challenge the underlying 
argumentation scheme, with, what I refer to as, a scheme criticism: “Why (If some 
expert says A, then A)?” 
 
JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR 
6 
A critical reaction may have an unclear focus, and stand in need of 
clarification on that account. A critical reaction “Why so?”, in response to an 
argument “A so B” may, within a particular situation, be both interpreted as 
tenability criticism, and as connection criticism. And a critical reaction “What do you 
mean?” in response to a standpoint A may, dependent upon context, express a 
request for further argumentation, but it might also be meant more literally as a 
request for linguistic clarification. As with similar kinds of unclearness, if these 
specific readings play a role in the dialogue, either because the proponent needs to 
know in more detail what the critical reaction amounts to in order to respond 
adequately, or because the proponent misinterprets the focus of a critical reaction 
as intended by the opponent, then the criticism can be seen as – what I call – actively 
ambiguous (see also Section 6).  
 
3.2 Norm 
 
A critical reaction evaluates, or at least prepares for an evaluation, and the norm 
appealed to specifies from what normative perspective the – prospective – 
evaluation takes place. First, the critic may appeal to a rule for critical discussion. For 
example, a critical reaction may appeal to the obligation-to-defend rule, simply by 
posing a request for argumentation, so that it becomes clear to the proponent that if 
he does not respond with an argument, the opponent will remain unconvinced. 
Second, a critic may appeal to an optimality norm, a norm that distinguishes 
between non-fallacious moves of higher and of lower quality. For example, an 
argument may be judged as non-persuasive. Or it may be alleged that a more 
interesting argument is available. Third, the critic may appeal to an institutional 
norm, a norm that governs a particular argumentative activity type (cf. Van Eemeren 
and Houtlosser, 2005). For example, in court, the evidence may be objected to as 
“inadmissible” for having been obtained with inadmissible methods, regardless of 
its non-judicial persuasiveness. In many types of conversation, politeness can be 
seen as an “institutional” requirement, and some opinions, then, can be charged 
successfully as being offensive. 
But then, the critical reaction may be imprecise in this respect, so that the 
receiver reckons, or ought to reckon, with more than one reading. For example, the 
critic’s “You can’t say this” might both appeal to: (1) the obligation-to-defend rule, 
on the ground that this, apparently, cannot be proven; (2) some optimality rule, on 
the ground that this is unconvincing; (3) or to an institutional rule, on the ground 
that this, apparently, is situationally inappropriate.  
 
3.3 Level 
 
A critical reaction contributes more or less directly to the step-wise construction or 
destruction of the argumentation of the proponent. If it does so in quite a direct way, 
then the critical reaction can be seen as part of the ground level dialogue. For 
example, a challenge “Why A?” quite directly contributes to the construction of the 
proponent’s argumentation, by inviting him to add an argument in favor of A. 
However, the critical reaction may also be much more indirectly relevant to the 
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proponent’s argumentation, by dealing with the course of the dialogue, rather than 
with the topic at hand. In such cases, the critical reaction initiates, or continues, a 
meta level dialogue, which is a dialogue about a dialogue. A fallacy charge (i.e., a 
charge that the other side has violated a rule for critical discussion) is a prime 
example of starting a meta dialogue (Krabbe, 2003). Secondly, discussing strategic 
issues, for example when criticizing an argument as weak, flawed or even as a 
blunder, can be located at a meta level of dialogue. Third, a violation of an 
institutional rule may be labeled as a fault, and charging one’s interlocutor with a 
fault and can be seen as a meta level contribution. 
A critical reaction may be unclear as to whether it aims at contributing to the 
continuation of the ground level dialogue, or whether it aspires at a meta dialogue. 
An unspecified critical reaction such as “that’s too stupid” could both be taken as a 
rough way of challenging a statement, but also as a way of pointing out a weakness 
in the proponent’s strategy. Similarly, responding to an argument by saying 
something to the effect that “this is improper” may, by lack of specification of the 
kind of norm appealed to, constitute a charge of fallacy, or a charge of fault.  
 
3.4 Force 
 
Finally, a critical reaction instances a particular type of speech act, and exhibits a 
particular illocutionary force, or it forms a complex of such speech acts (Searle, 
1979). A critical reaction can be a directive, such as a request for clarification, or a 
request for an argument – which I refer to as a challenge. Or the critical reaction can 
be an assertive, when denying a statement by the interlocutor, or when pointing out 
some flaw or fallacy in the interlocutor’s contribution.  
A critical reaction may be unclear by leaving the interlocutor with more than 
one option when having to decide about how to understand the illocutionary force 
of the critical response, and thereby about how to respond to it. For one, a response 
such as “No!” may be expressive of a denial, but the context might leave open the 
option that it expresses a mere request for an argument for A. 
Special mention must be made of a critical reaction that is complex by 
containing reasoning. Reasoning constitutes argumentation, as I use the term, only if 
it serves a persuasive purpose. In that case, the opponent tries to reason from what 
her interlocutor is or should be prepared to concede toward a thesis of her own, and 
thereby she becomes a second proponent. For example,  she may defend that the 
other side has committed a fallacy, or she may defend the denial of his standpoint 
(counter-argumentation). But then, the critical reaction may also contain reasoning 
that serves an explanatory purpose only. In that case, the opponent offers reasons in 
order to show to the proponent what motivates or underlies her critical stance. In 
such a situation, the reasoning does not constitute argumentation, for it does not 
claim to start from the other side’s concessions, and neither does it aim at 
persuasion. A reason put forward in such an explanation of a critical stance is what 
we earlier have referred to as an (explanatory) counter-consideration. Norms for 
introducing counter-considerations are the subject of the Section 4, whereas 
Sections 5 and 6 deal with the required level of specificity of such counter-
considerations. 
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4. THE BURDEN OF CRITICISM 
 
Suppose that, in support of his standpoint that we ought to cancel our hike, the 
proponent offers the argument that it is going to rain next week, and that the 
opponent offers tenability criticism, requesting for argumentation in support of the 
proponent’s weather forecast. In such a situation, the proponent has a burden of 
proof. But before discharging his burden of proof, he may first want to obtain 
information about what motivates the opponent not to accept his reason, so as to 
enable himself to devise an argument that stands a serious chance at convincing this 
particular opponent. So, instead of giving a reason in support of the weather 
forecast, the proponent first puts forward a request for explanation: “Please, explain 
why you do not accept that it is going to rain next week?”  I shall code this request as 
“Explain (Why A?).” (See Van Laar & Krabbe, 2013 for a statement of the theory put 
forward in this section.) 
If the opponent provides such an explanation, she does so by expressing a 
proposition that Krabbe and I have referred to as a counter-consideration, and that 
has been coded as “Counter C” (2013). In the example, the counter-consideration is 
the proposition: “No weatherman says that it is going to rain next week,” and this 
counter-consideration can be presented by the opponent in two different ways to 
the proponent. When offering a counter-consideration, an opponent may stress her 
aim of showing the tenability of her critical position: “As far as you’ve shown, the 
weathermen didn’t say so.” Exactly the same message, however, could be expressed 
more modestly, “How about the weathermen? What do they say about it?” in which 
case the opponent, as it were, provides the proponent with a strategic advice, 
stressing his individual aim of persuasion. The implicit advice to the proponent, 
then, is to refute the counter-consideration, by saying something to the effect that 
“This weatherman did make this very forecast,” or to refute it by stating that his 
forecast stands, even if no weatherman were to vouch for it. 
In both cases, it is important to note that the opponent does not really assert 
that there is no weatherman who forecasted the rain, at least not in the sense that 
she incurs a burden of proof for this proposition. Rescher introduced the notion of a 
“cautious assertion,” which clarifies the typical illocutionary force of a counter-
consideration. According to Rescher, a cautious assertion of a proposition P, 
indicated by †P, stands for: “P is the case for all that you (the adversary) have 
shown” or “P’s being the case is compatible with everything you’ve said (i.e., have 
maintained or conceded)” (Rescher, 1977, p. 6). Consequently, it is possibly for the 
opponent to raise a critical reaction that is highly informative to the proponent by 
conveying her motives for being critical and thereby giving him strategic advice, 
without, however, becoming strongly committed to these propositions. 
What set of norms for critical discussion should govern counter-
considerations, according to this theory? First, the opponent has a responsibility to 
make her contributions more than minimally directive, because the quality of the 
dialogue improves if the opponent, in addition to raising a mere challenge, also 
offers a counter-consideration, so that the probability increases of a qualitatively 
good argumentative response by the proponent.  
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Second, in some situations this responsibility of the opponent becomes a 
genuine obligation to provide a counter-consideration, but only if the opponent has 
criticized a proposition that counts as one of her presumptive commitments. A 
presumptive commitment, as understood here, is a commitment to a proposition A, 
such that if you withdraw your commitment to A, for example by challenging A, you 
incur the obligation to explain the withdrawal of A, if the other side requests so, or 
to provide a (meta level) argument in favor of the (institutional) appropriateness of 
the withdrawal of A, if the other side requests so (Van Laar & Krabbe, 2013). Thus, if 
A is a presumptive commitment, and the proponent requests the opponent to 
explain her challenge of A, the opponent must offer a counter-consideration. 
Whether a proposition counts as such a presumption is, of course, highly dependent 
on the context of the dialogue. In a situation where it is considered common 
knowledge that it rains halfway May, the opponent in that season must explain her 
reluctance to accept this proposition, whereas in other situations, her counter-
consideration is welcome, but not really obligatory. Another example would be that 
by entering the gym, even a philosophical skeptic incurs a presumptive commitment 
to having a physical body, whereas in a company of skeptics, challenging the 
existence of your physical body does not force you to explain yourself (cf. Rescorla, 
2009). 
 
5. REQUESTS FOR ARGUMENTATION, AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SPECIFICITY 
 
In this section, I shall focus on the most basic type of critical reaction, where the 
opponent focuses on the propositional content of the proponent’s standpoint, or of 
one the reasons of the proponent’s argument, or of its connection premise, thereby 
appealing to the obligation-to-defend rule, at a ground level of dialogue. Following 
the pragma-dialectical theory, we can characterize its illocutionary force as that of a 
request, in this case a request for an argument. Argumentative dialogue is to a 
limited degree competitive, and in order to stress the game-like nature of critical 
discussion, one might legitimately refer to these requests as tests, or challenges or 
even as attacks. However, even if the focus of the attack, challenge, test or request, 
has been made fully explicit by the opponent, so that the proponent knows what 
proposition(s) to defend, the criticism may lack specificity by refraining from 
making it fully explicit what response would answer the criticism satisfactorily: 
What would count as a test passed? What as a challenge met? What as a successful 
defense against the attack? What kind of argument, exactly, has been requested for?  
 In this paper, I shall restrict myself to situations where the opponent 
specifies her critical stance by informing the proponent about what kind of 
argument might turn out to be convincing to her, and more in particular, instances 
of what argumentation schemes could be convincing. First, I shall summarize some 
key elements of the theory of argumentation schemes, and then return to the issue 
of more and less specific critical reactions. 
An argumentation scheme is a scheme for deductive or defeasible reasoning, 
containing a number of variables. A rule with which to give argumentation schemes 
their binding force is the following, which will be referred to as The Binding Rule (cf. 
van Laar, 2011). 
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The Binding Rule: If the opponent has adopted an argumentation 
scheme as prima facie acceptable, and the proponent offers an 
argument that clearly instantiates that scheme, the connection 
premise of that argument counts as a presumptive commitment of the 
opponent, so that if she wants to challenge this connection premise, 
she must offer a counter-consideration that explains her criticism of 
the connection premise, if the proponent requests so, or she must 
explain her criticism towards the argument’s conclusion in a different 
manner, or in a more precise manner, if the proponent requests so. 
 
I shall list four argumentation schemes, taken from Walton, Reed and 
Macagno (2008), albeit simplified and adjusted to the purpose of this paper: 
 
- The argumentation scheme From Expert Opinion: “Expert E says that 
A. Therefore A.” 
- The argumentation scheme From Popularity: “Almost everybody says 
that A. Therefore A.” 
- The argumentation scheme From Position to Know: “Person P is in a 
position to know A and says that A. Therefore A.” 
- The argumentation scheme From Consequences: “Action A has positive 
consequences. Therefore we should do A.” 
 
So, if From Expert Opinion is a prima facie acceptable scheme to the opponent, and 
the proponent argues: “Weatherman Erwin says that it’s going to rain, therefore it is 
going to rain”, then the opponent can only raise a connection criticism “Why would 
it rain next week if weatherman Erwin says so?” if she is prepared to offer, on 
request, a counter-consideration (which in this context is often called a defeater, cf. 
Pollock, 1995), such as “Erwin might have been confused, or drunk, or maybe he 
was joking,” or to offer, on request, a different or more specific challenge of the 
argument's conclusion, such as "Why do you think it is going to rain; What 
meteorological indications did you find?" Note that connection criticism must be 
distinguished from scheme criticism, which would amount to a challenge of the 
prima facie acceptability of an argumentation scheme: “Why would we accept some 
proposition of the say-so of some expert?” 
I return now to the issue of more or less specific critical reactions. At the 
lowest level of specificity, a mere request “Why P?”, not accompanied with any 
counter-consideration, provides no further indications to the proponent 
whatsoever, about how to respond to it, except conveying the most general advice to 
offer some argument or other. A challenge at this lowest level of specificity, focused 
at a regular reason or at a connection premise,3 can be characterized as not giving 
                                                        
3 A request “Why (If A then B)?,” in response to an argument “A so B,” must be seen as a request to  
the proponent to provide an argument such that the connection from A to B becomes acceptable, and 
there are two ways in which the proponent may choose to do so. First, the proponent may choose to 
put forward a new argument in favor of the connection premise under attack. Second, he may 
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any clue as to what argumentation scheme should be used by the proponent in 
order to convince the opponent. It is a most general request for argumentation, 
inciting the proponent to offer an argument, of whatever type, in favor of the 
proposition challenged. 
At a somewhat higher level of specificity, a challenge dissuades the 
proponent from using some argumentation schemes, but still leaves open a range of 
options. For example, the critical reaction “Why so? Says who?” makes it quite clear 
that the opponent does not request for an argument from consequences, but rather 
an argument from expert opinion, or from position to know, or possibly from 
popular opinion, that is, an argument that starts from the premise that one or more 
persons said something. 
At an even higher level of specificity, the counter-consideration makes it fully 
clear what kind of argumentation scheme might be convincing to the opponent, for 
example: “Why so? Is there an expert who vouches for it?” This might be labeled a 
scheme bound challenge (see Krabbe, 2007, for the related notion of a bound 
challenge). The proponent, in those cases, is invited to apply the argumentation 
scheme From Expert Opinion to the case at hand. So, the move “Why so? Is there an 
expert who vouches for it?” conveys the counter-consideration “There is no expert 
who vouches for it,” and the invited argument refutes it: “It is going to rain next 
week, because weatherman Erwin says so.” (Note that a challenge might even be 
fully specific, by stating the very proposition to be refuted by the proponent: “Why 
so? As far as you have shown, weatherman Erwin hasn’t made this very forecast”.) 
Scheme bound challenges are highly specific, and provide the proponent with 
quite clear advice. However, at all lower levels of specificity, the challenges may not 
provide the proponent with sufficient information, and the proponent may want to 
request the opponent to specify her challenge further. In particular contexts, quite 
unspecific counter-considerations may generate ambiguities, for example if the 
opponent means to express a request for an argument from expertise, but does so 
with an overly general formulation “Why so? Says who?”, so that the proponent 
comes to misinterpret it as a request for an argument from popularity. The resulting 
argument from popularity, “Because everybody says so!”, might not satisfy the 
opponent’s needs, and remain non-persuasive to her. The proponent’s choice of this 
argument, however, has not been the sole responsibility of the proponent. Part of 
the responsibility might be traced to the opponent’s choice to use an imprecise 
formulation of her challenge, that, to some degree, also pointed in the direction of 
the argumentation scheme From Popularity. I will return to this issue in Section 8. 
Of course, a challenge at a  low level of specificity can be perfectly 
appropriate, for the opponent may have no clue about what might convince her, and 
simply is curious about what strategy the proponent might come up with. 
Consequently, dialogue rules should balance between the desirability of highly 
informative counter-considerations on the opponent’s part, and leaving the 
discharge of the burden of proof to the proponent. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
strengthen the connection between the earlier adduced premises and conclusion, by adding one or 
more premises to A, such that A together with the newly added premises provide sufficient support 
for B. In response to tenability criticism, the preferred response is simply an argument in favor of A.  
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6. RULES FOR DEALING WITH UNSPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ARGUMENTATION 
 
I shall propose four general rules that accommodate challenges at different levels of 
specificity. The rules start from the following points of departure: (1) The opponent 
should be encouraged, but not obligated, to specify her criticism up to the level of 
scheme bound challenges; (2) A fair mechanism for implementing this is to consider 
(at least temporarily) the opponent to have adopted the argumentation scheme (if 
any) that underlies the proponent's argument in response to the opponent's 
challenge, if this challenge does not exclude that argumentation scheme, such that 
The Binding Rule applies and the argument's connection premise comes to count as 
a presumptive commitment on the opponent’s part; (3) At no point does the 
opponent incur a genuine burden of proof by challenging a proposition or by 
explaining such a mere challenge, at least not in the sense of incurring the obligation 
to offer an argument that starts from concessions made by the interlocutor. Instead, 
she is only concerned with discharging a burden of criticism, which pertains to 
providing motivating explanations, or equivalently in this kind of context, strategic 
advice. 
Rule 1. The proponent is allowed to request for an explanation of any 
challenge that is not a scheme bound challenge. 
Rule 2. In response to a request for an explanation, the opponent is allowed 
to specify her challenge, put forward at an earlier stage, with a more or less specific 
counter-consideration, but she also has a right to make a remark to the effect that 
she has no further explanation to offer, if at least she had not challenged a 
proposition that counts as a presumption. The “no further explanation” option is 
needed, because we should not discourage persons from adopting the role of the 
opponent in a discussion, if  they are not sufficiently knowledgeable, or otherwise 
geared to offer more informative criticisms. The dialogue in Figure 2 conforms to 
these first two rules: At the stage 3 and 5, the proponent does not pretend to 
discharge his burden of proof, but invites clarification, or further clarification, of the 
opponent’s critical stance, in preparation of a future discharge of his burden of 
proof. 
 
 
Figure 2.  
 
 Rule 3. Suppose, the opponent challenges a proposition A in a quite unspecific 
way, for example with a pure challenge or with a challenge that gives some 
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directions but is not yet scheme bound, and suppose that request leaves the 
proponent with the option to apply a particular type of argumentation scheme. 
Then, if the proponent does apply that argumentation scheme, the opponent must 
be seen, at least in the course of the discussion about this very thesis, as having 
adopted the argumentation scheme used. More in detail, it means that the 
connection premise of the argument becomes a presumptive commitment of the 
opponent. Consequently, by the Binding Rule, the opponent incurs the obligation to 
explain her challenge of the connection premise, if so requested by the proponent, 
as well as the obligation to further explain her challenge of A, if so requested by the 
proponent. By including this rule of a dialogue system, the opponent is encouraged 
to provide scheme bound challenges, for the reason that they bring less 
(presumptive) commitments than challenges that leave more options open to the 
proponent. See figure 3 for two courses of a dialogue that illustrate the resulting 
dialectic. 
 
 
Figure 3. 
 
Suppose, the opponent’s challenge is either scheme bound, or at least not fully 
unspecific, and clearly excludes, say, the argumentation scheme From 
Consequences: “Why A? Says what expert?” or “Why A? Says who?” Then, if the 
proponent offers an argument from consequences, this does not result in a 
presumptive commitment on the opponent’s part to the connection premise of that 
argument. And neither does it lead to an obligation to be more precise about the 
initial challenge. (Note that the opponent may be committed to the argumentation 
scheme on separate grounds, so that in such situations, the connection premise 
constitutes a presumptive commitment, after all.) So, in that situation, the opponent 
has a right but not an obligation to make her initial challenge more specific, if it 
were not scheme bound already, or to explain her challenge of the connection 
premise. See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. 
 
Consequently, criticism is never completely noncommittal, because the proponent 
has the means available to force the opponent either to make her challenge scheme 
bound, or to make her adopt his choice of argumentation scheme.  
Fourth, the opponent becomes committed to a particular argumentation 
scheme as soon as she makes an explicit request for argumentation of that 
particular type. If so, the opponent can no longer raise a scheme criticism. If an 
opponent explicitly requests for an argument from expert opinion, the proponent 
may assume that the opponent holds the argumentation scheme from expert 
opinion to be prima facie acceptable. It would be fair to deal with the argumentation 
scheme as a fixed (non-presumptive) concession on the opponent’s part for the 
remainder of the discussion. If the opponent is thus committed to an argumentation 
scheme, she cannot raise a scheme criticism against that very scheme, although she 
retains her right to raise a specific connection criticism which is directed against a 
specific application of the scheme. In other words: A scheme bound challenge binds 
the opponent to adopt the argumentation scheme indicated. The inadmissibility of a 
move is in Figure 5 indicated with asterisks. 
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
7. AMBIGUITY 
 
There is a close link between criticism that lacks specificity, and criticism that is 
ambiguous. In an earlier paper, I have adopted the term “active ambiguity” from 
Arne Naess (1966). As I use the term, an expression as used in a particular dialogue 
context is actively ambiguous if and only if: (1) the expression is contextually 
ambiguous, by linguistically allowing of more than one reading, even after having 
taken the contextual clues into account; (2) the ambiguity is covert, in the sense that 
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the proponent does not make it clear that it forms a figure of style, or a joke, or that 
he intends the expression to be understood in more than one sense in another way; 
and (3) the ambiguity is interactionally relevant, such that a participant’s choosing, 
or starting from, the one reading instead of another is consequential for the course 
of the dialogue (van Laar, 2010). Are there situations where an active ambiguity 
within the proponent’s argument can be traced back to an active ambiguity in the 
opponent’s criticism? 
I shall use one of Hamblin’s examples of (subtle) equivocation: “All acts 
prescribed by law are obligatory. Non-performance of an obligatory act is to be 
condemned. So, non-performance of an act prescribed by law is to be condemned.” 
The opponent may want to resists the conclusion (taking “condemned” in a moral 
sense) on the ground that she distinguishes between a legal and a moral sense of the 
expression “obligatory.” Given the two occurrences of this term in the reasoning, 
there are four possible disambiguations of the reasoning. And neither of these 
generates an argument that both has two acceptable regular premises, as well as an 
acceptable connection premise.  
Hamblin (1970) explains that it is not feasible to devise dialogue rules that 
exclude this kind of equivocal reasoning, for the participants may disagree on 
whether an expression is ambiguous. In the example above, the proponent may 
contend that there is no distinction between moral and legal norms. Hamblin’s 
conclusion is that dialogue systems should be extended with points of order, with 
which the participants can talk about their dialogue, and monitor its course. 
Hamblin’s student, Mackenzie, elaborated on this idea by devising a dialogue system 
that enables a participant to initiate this kind of meta-dialogue, by saying something 
to the effect of “Distinguo! I make a distinction between a moral and a legal sense of 
the expression obligatory.” In this way, the participants improve upon their own 
language by introducing more precise expressions if the need for more precision 
arises (Mackenzie 1988). Translated to the situation of a simple critical discussion, it 
is up to the opponent  to charge the proponent with equivocation, and it is up to the 
proponent to repair this flaw by choosing a (possibly mixed) disambiguation.  
In line with other scholars (see Walton, 1996, chapter 2), Mackenzie 
conceives of the fallacy of equivocation as a problem on the proponent’s side. But, 
given the close connections between argumentation and criticism, there is some 
room for doubt. It seems plausible that in at least some situations, the proponent’s 
equivocal argument can be partly blamed on the opponent, on account of her 
insufficiently specific, or even actively ambiguous counter-consideration. Take the 
example where the proponent airs his opinion that “Non-performance of an act 
prescribed by law is to be (morally) condemned,” and that the opponent challenges 
it by saying “Why so? Is the performance of an act prescribed by law a matter of 
obligation?” Then the proponent is invited to offer an argument along the lines of 
“Because all acts prescribed by law are obligatory, and non-performance of an 
obligatory act is to be condemned” (an instance of some argumentation scheme 
From Rules, see Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 343-344). Now, if the opponent 
justly points out the active ambiguity in the expression “obligatory,” it seems 
reasonable if the proponent retorts by saying something to the effect that it is the 
opponent who is responsible for introducing this ambiguous expression, and that 
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she should first disambiguate her counter-consideration, at least before the 
proponent proceeds by disambiguating his argumentation. Consequently, it is quite 
plausible that in some situations, the opponent is partly responsible for a fallacy of 
ambiguity by the proponent, for the reason that the ambiguity can be traced back to 
an active ambiguity in one of the opponent’s counter-considerations. 
To buttress my hypothesis that counter-considerations can be actively 
ambiguous, I shall elaborate on a different example. Suppose, the proponent states 
his opinion that we should keep spending 0,7% of our gross national product to 
development aid (as has for long been practice in the Netherlands), and that the 
opponent challenges it in a quite, but not fully specific way, by saying “Why so? As 
far as you’ve shown, this policy’s positive consequences might not outweigh its 
negative consequences.” The opponent, then, clearly requests for an argument from 
consequences. But then, the proponent might make a distinction between an 
argumentation scheme From Consequences In The Light Of A Common Good, and an 
argumentation scheme From Consequences In The Light Of A Private Or At Least A 
Partisan Interest. The opponent’s counter-consideration is ambiguous in leaving 
both options open. The ambiguity is interactionally relevant, for if the proponent 
interprets the request for argumentation as a request for an argument from 
consequences in light of a private or a partisan interest, the dialogue shifts towards 
an interest-based negotiation dialogue, whereas, if he understands it to be a request 
for an argument from consequences in light of a common good, the dialogue can be 
expected to steer towards a value-based persuasion dialogue (see on dialogue types, 
Walton & Krabbe, 1995). Therefore, the proponent may want the opponent to be 
clarify, or even disambiguate her challenge.  
The same initial situation may also lead to a reading by the proponent that 
does not fit the opponent’s intention. In that case, the opponent herself must raise 
the issue of ambiguity, for now she probably wants to repair the miscommunication. 
So, if the proponent’s standpoint “We should spend 0.7% of the GNP to development 
aid” is met with the opponent’s challenge “Why so? How to assess this policy in the 
light of its consequences?”, and the proponent in return argues “In return for your 
acceptance of our policy, we are willing to accept your preferred austerity 
measures”, then the opponent may want to point out the ambiguity in her counter-
consideration, by saying something to the effect “I meant: How to assess this policy 
in the light of the consequences for a common good?” In these cases, I prefer not to 
label the point of order an ambiguity criticism, but rather an ambiguity correction, 
which forms a kind of self-criticism. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I contributed to the theory of criticism by examining to what degree an 
opponent should specify her critical challenges. The proposed rules strike a balance 
between on the one hand making the opponent’s criticism as directive, informative 
and specific as possible, and on the other hand, enabling the opponent to examine 
and discuss topics that are outside of her field of expertise. The idea has been that 
the opponent may, initially, raise highly unspecific criticisms, but that the proponent 
should have the means available for inciting the opponent to become ever more 
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specific about her critical position, until at least her challenges have become scheme 
bound challenges. It has become clear that unspecific criticism is closely connected 
to ambiguity in both criticism and in argument. How rules for dealing with 
ambiguity and rules for dealing with lack of specificity in criticism should be 
combined in a dialogue system is an open issue to be left for a future occasion.  
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